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DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
None. {See Brief of Appellant, hereafter "Br. of Aplnt.," at 1.)
ARGUMENT
The parties are in basic agreement on the facts, issues, standard of review, and
standards for interpretation of restrictive covenants.

The points of dispute are legal

questions: whether the covenants permit construction of a chapel, whether the covenants
may be amended to permit a chapel, and whether the covenants are ambiguous as to
either of those questions. If an ambiguity does exist, this Court may resolve the question
as a matter of law on the undisputed record before it, remanding for further factual
development only if the existing evidence is considered inadequate to reach a conclusion.
The language of the Declaration of Building and Use Restrictions ("Declaration")
for Montana Ranchos Subdivision ("MRS") No. 2 does not expressly prohibit a chapel; in
fact, the residential covenant may be interpreted to permit a chapel. If the language is
considered ambiguous, the Affidavit of Arlen Fox, the developer and grantor who imposed
the restrictions, plainly resolves the ambiguity to permit a chapel.

Furthermore, the

language of the Declaration does not expressly prohibit amendment of its terms; in fact,
the language authorizes changes by a "majority" of lot owners.

If the amendment

provision is considered ambiguous, evidence of majority amendment of the identical
covenants for the related MRS No. 3, in which Janyce Fox, the co-grantor, participated,
and in which some of the plaintiffs acquiesced, resolves the ambiguity to permit the chapel
by amendment.,

POINT I:

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
DECLARATION UNAMBIGUOUSLY PROHIBITS A CHAPEL AND
THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF ARLEN FOX MAY NOT BE INVOKED TO
PERMIT A CHAPEL.

A. Interpretation Of The Residential Covenant.
Plaintiffs appear to accept by acquiescence the Church's interpretation that a
chapel is consistent with the "residential purpose" covenant of Part B.l. of the Declaration,
but they argue that a chapel structure would violate the "building type" restriction, which
limits structures to a single-family dwelling and garage. (Brief of Appellees, hereafter "Br.
of Aplees.," at 7.) However, the record contains no evidence of the form of the proposed
chapel, or that the form was disapproved by the Architectural Control Committee. (See
Part B.l., Addendum to Br. of Aplnt, hereafter "Add.," at 3.) If it is the form of the
building, rather than its use, to which plaintiffs object, such an objection is purely
hypothetical without record evidence. A chapel may be designed and landscaped to blend
in with its residential setting, and there is no evidence that was not done here.
Plaintiffs cite no authority for their assertion that a chapel would necessarily
violate the "building type" restriction; rather, they simply offer an abstract review of the
cases cited by the Church in support of a chapel, without challenging the principles for
which those cases are cited. (Br. of Aplees. at 7-13.) The cited cases establish two
conclusions:

One, that residential covenants are generally construed to prohibit only

business, commercial, or other uses incompatible with a residential purpose (Br. of Aplnt.
at 8); and two, that a chapel has been considered consistent with residential uses and
covenants (id. at 9-10). Plaintiffs' attempted distinctions in the cited cases do not alter
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those conclusions. The cases stand precisely for what they were cited, not for what
plaintiffs claim they were cited.1
Plaintiffs' emphasis on the "building type" language of Part B.l. also leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the residential covenant is ambiguous. The language of Part
B.l. does not "expressly" prohibit a chapel, as plaintiffs assert (Br. of Aplees. at 12).
Neither the word "chapel" nor any similar reference is included. Moreover the restriction
of buildings to a single-family dwelling cannot be strictly interpreted because Part B.8.
permits barns, outbuildings, and other structures, as long as they are not used as a
residence. Part B.IO., authorizing the keeping of livestock, also implies that non-dwelling
buildings will be tolerated as consistent with the intent of the residential covenant. It
would appear that a chapel fits within the intent of the "single-family dwelling" provision
as well as a barn or other structure. These inconsistent provisions at least create an
ambiguity that requires resort to extrinsic evidence. See Bumgarner & Bowman Building,
Inc. v. Hollar, 111 S.E.2d 60, 61-62 (N.C. App. 1969). The ambiguity of Part B.l. is
amplified in this particular case, given the 5-acre size of Lot 34 relative to the other lots,
which are all one-half acre in size. (See Br. of Aplnt. at 12-13.)

1

For example, Emma v. Silvestri, 227 A2d 480 (R.L 1967), does illustrate that while a dental office
is incompatible with a residential covenant, a chapel need not be. (Br. of Aplnt. at 8, 10). In St.
Luke's Episcopal Church v. Berry, 163 S.E.2d 664 (N.C. App. 1968), the absence of a restriction in the
church's deed, emphasized by plaintiffs here, demonstrates that developers generally do not consider
chapels inconsistent with residential covenants. Similarly, there is no record of a restriction in the
Church's deed in the present case. Finally, contrary to plaintiffs' reading of Flinkingshelt v. Johnson, 187
S.E.2d 233, 237 (S.C. 1972) (Br. of Aplees. at 11), that case does observe that n[t]he existence of schools
and churches within a large residential area . . . is no indication of a breakdown or deviation from the
general residential scheme or purpose of the [residential] restrictions.

3

In summary, the judgment may not be affirmed on the basis of either the
"residential purpose" or "building type" provision of Part B.l. The cases cited by the
Church demonstrate that such provisions do not prohibit a chapel as a matter of law, but
may permit a chapel as consistent with the intent of the framers. At the very least, such
language should be considered ambiguous as applied to construction of a chapel on the
only 5-acre lot in the subdivision.
B. Admission Of The Affidavit Of Arlen Fox.
Plaintiffs argue that the Affidavit of Arlen Fox was inadmissible hearsay in the
district court, because Mr. Fox is now deceased, and that his affidavit therefore may not
be relied upon as evidence of his intent to permit a chapel in MRS No. 2. However, the
record in this case contains no direct evidence of Mr. Fox's death. Moreover, because the
district court admitted the evidence below, over plaintiffs' objections, and plaintiffs failed
to file a cross-appeal challenging admission of the evidence, they may not now raise the
issue on appeal. See, e.g., Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506, 511 n.ll (Utah
1990) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to address claim of appellees not preserved by
cross-appeal); L. Grauman Soda Fountain Co. v. Etter, 16 P.2d 417, 419 (Ariz. 1932)
(appellee failed to challenge admission of evidence by cross-appeal).
Even if this Court chooses to address plaintiffs' hearsay claim, it is evident that
the Fox Affidavit was properly admitted under the residual hearsay exception of Rule
804(b)(5), Utah R. Evid., which states in relevant part:
(b) The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
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(5) A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. . . .
The Fox Affidavit satisfies the conditions of Rule 804(b)(5) for admission. First,
the affidavit has sufficient "guarantees of trustworthiness" because it was given under oath,
under circumstances to allow free expression of the truth, and without any motive for
untruthfulness. See Justak Bros, and Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 664 F.2d 1074,
1081 (7th Cir. 1981) (admitting pretrial affidavit under Rule 804); Copperweld Steel Co.
v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953, 964 (3rd Cir. 1978) (admitting attorney's
memorandum of witness interview). Second, the affidavit pertains to the material fact of
Mr. Fox's intent, as framer of the Declaration, with regard to interpretation of the
residential covenant. Plainly, Mr. Fox was the person best suited to express his own
intent as developer. See Copperweld Steel, supra, at 964. Third, for the reason just stated,
the affidavit is more probative on the point of Mr. Fox's intent than any other available
evidence; in fact, no other evidence on that point is available. Id.

See also State v.

Horton, 1993 WL 57791, Slip Op. at 4 (Utah App., Mar. 3, 1993) (affirming exclusion of
affidavit because five other witnesses had testified on same matter). Plaintiffs presented
no contrary evidence. The Affidavits of Jack Lochhead and Don Adams do not dispute
that Mr. Fox never intended the residential covenant to prohibit a chapel.
5

Finally,

admission of the affidavit serves the interests of justice because it is the best evidence
available of the framer's intent with regard to interpretation of the residential covenant.
Plaintiffs could have deposed and cross-examined Mr. Fox, but did not do so.
In summary, this Court should reject plaintiffs' challenge to the Fox Affidavit
because they failed to preserve the issue by cross-appeal, and the affidavit was properly
admitted under Rule 804.
POINT H:

PI^JNTEFFS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
DECLARATION UNAMBIGUOUSLY PROHIBITS THE MAJORITY
AMENDMENT TO PERMIT THE CHAPEL.

A. Interpretation Of The Amendment Provision.
The Church has demonstrated that the "unless" clause of Part D.l. of the
Declaration permits majority amendment of the covenants during the initial 40 years, as
well as during the extension periods, and alternatively, that the provision is ambiguous as
to amendability. (Br. of Aplnt. at 14-18.) Plaintiffs maintain that Part D.l. "clearly"
prohibits any amendment during the first 40 years, arguing that if the covenants could be
amended at any time, the reference to an initial 40-year period would be "meaningless."
(Br. of Aplees. at 22, 26.) However, that reasoning is not valid. Under the interpretation
permitting amendment during the initial period, the 40-year provision would still serve the
purpose of setting the duration of the covenants in the absence of amendment. The few
foreign cases cited by plaintiffs overlook that fact, and the Utah cases cited do not decide
the issue.
The two different plausible interpretations of the amendment language lead to the
legal conclusion that the provision is ambiguous and may not be interpreted as a matter
6

of law. Whereas most restrictive covenants contain separate provisions governing duration
and amendability, Part D.l. is made ambiguous by the combination of both subjects in a
single provision. {See cases in Br. of Aplnt. at 17, cited for illustrative purposes, not for
the points claimed in Br. of Aplees. at 25.) The court in Valdes v. Moore, 476 S.W.2d
936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), construing language similar to Part D.l., acknowledged the
ambiguity:
A reading of the above quoted duration provision from the
original restrictions clearly presents a question of construction. The
proviso therein does not specifically limit the time as to which the
restrictions may be amended. The language does not specifically
say that the restrictions may be amended by the majority within the
first 25 years, nor does it say that they may not be amended within
such period. A literal reading of the language used would indicate
that the owners of a majority of the lots could amend the
restrictions before the first 25 year period had ended. [Id. at 939.]
The court concluded that, while such language "cannot be construed as a matter of law,"
id., the summary judgment permitting majority amendment during the initial period should
be upheld on the basis of "judicial admission" by the party challenging the amendment, id.
at 940-41.
In summary, Part D.l. does not clearly prohibit majority amendment during the
initial 40-year period. Accordingly, the Court should "resolve all doubts in favor of the
free and unrestricted use of property." Parish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 336 P.2d 122,
123 (1959). See also Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., 40 A.2d 522, 526 (Md. 1945) (strictly
construing amendment provision in favor of the free use of the property). The Church's
unchallenged extrinsic evidence of intent to permit majority amendment justifies entry of
judgment enforcing the amendment.
7

B. The Amendment Need Not Be Unanimous.
Plaintiffs argue that, regardless of the language of Part D.l. of the Declaration,
the amendment deleting Lot 34 from the covenants required the unanimous approval of
the lot owners because the amendment does not have a uniform effect. (Br. of Aplees.
at 27-30.) However, the uniformity of effect involves factual questions that cannot be
decided as a matter of law. A factfinder could conclude that the amendment is uniform
in that all remaining lots continue to be governed by the Declaration and will be affected
equally by the amendment permitting the chapel and park on Lot 34. Plaintiffs' argument
would produce the anomalous result of requiring that the amendment permit a chapel and
park on every half-acre lot in the subdivision. Given the vastly disproportionate size of
Lot 34, perfect uniformity in the application of covenants and amendments, as between
Lot 34 and the smaller remaining lots, is not possible. For example, Part B.10., permitting
up to six head of horses and cattle on each lot, has had practical application only to Lot
34. The framer of the Declaration and the lot owners must reasonably have anticipated
and expected some disproportionate impact in the application of covenants as between
Lot 34 and the remaining lots.
Plaintiffs rely on Montoya v. Barreras, 473 P.2d 363 (N.M. 1970), and La
Esperanza Townhome Ass'n v. Title Security Agency, 689 P.2d 178 (Ariz. App. 1984). Those
cases invalidated majority amendments to delete certain lots from the restrictive covenants
on the basis that the amendments did not have a uniform effect, despite express covenant
language permitting majority amendment.

Such an extreme rule has never been, and

should not be, adopted in Utah, where permissibility of an amendment is governed by the
8

covenant language, not by the perceived effect of the amendment. See generally Cecala
v. Thorley, 164 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah App. 1988). The New Mexico Supreme Court has
since retreated from Montoya, permitting nonunanimous amendments under a factual
"reasonableness" test. Appel v. Presley Companies, 806 P.2d 1054, 1056 (N.M. 1991). The
cases cited by plaintiffs simply go far beyond Utah law.
Plaintiffs also cite Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981), in support of
requiring a unanimous amendment, while conceding that the case did not address the
precise issue here.

(Br. of Aplees. at 29.)

Crimmins rejected a purported majority

amendment of a restrictive covenant against home businesses. However, Crimmins is
distinguishable from Montoya and La Esperanza because the amendment in Crimmins did
have the uniform effect of allowing a business in any of the residences. Id. at 480.
Therefore, the court did not require unanimity because of nonuniform effect. Neither
can Crimmins be read to require unanimity in all amendments of restrictive covenants; no
other case in the country has gone that far, and the cases cited by Crimmins permit
nonunanimous amendments consistent with the terms of the covenants. See Rogers v.
Zwolak, 110 A. 674, 676 (Del. Ch. 1920). Hie only possible basis for the ruling in
Crimmins is that the court interpreted the amendment provision in that case to prohibit
nonunanimous amendment during the initial 25-year period of the covenants. See 636
P.2d at 479. However, because the amendment language there is not quoted by the court,
no comparison can be made with Part D.l. in the present case. Accordingly, Crimmins
is not helpful in resolving the issue here, whether Part D.l. requires the amendment
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permitting a chapel and park on Lot 34 to be unanimous. Because the language of Part
D.l. makes no mention of unanimity, but refers only to "majority" amendment, the
amendment here should be upheld.
Cases from other jurisdictions support that conclusion. If the covenant language
permits amendment or even termination by majority vote, property owners must be
deemed to have constructive notice of such provisions, and those provisions must be
enforced as written, even if it results in prejudice to some owners. See, e.g., Warren v.
Del Pizzo, 611 P.2d 309 (Or. App. 1980) (majority amendment of building height
restrictions); Brown v. McDavid, 676 P.2d 714 (Colo. App. 1983) (termination by 66
percent of owners). As stated in Warren:
While it is recognized that the challenged amendment to the
"Declaration of Restriction" operates to the prejudice of plaintiffs
and others similarly situated, the record shows that the proviso
authorizing this amendment was a part of the "Declaration" at the
time plaintiffs purchased their lots. Plaintiffs must therefore be
deemed to have had constructive notice of this provision and the
possibility at least that the building restrictions could conceivably be
changed in this fashion. [611 P.2d at 311.]
The same principles apply to a majority amendment, such as the one under
review, removing one lot, or a certain area, from the covenants. For example, in Bryant
v. Lake Highlands Development Co., 618 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), the required
90 percent of lot owners amended the declaration to remove certain lots from the
covenant restrictions. The plaintiffs challenged the amendment on the basis alleged here,
that "the alterations did not apply to all of the properties subject to the original
restrictions." Id. at 923. The court rejected that argument:

10

The terms of the Declaration clearly allow for amendment
if the requisite number of votes is achieved. There are no limitations
expressed as to the types of amendments allowed. All of the
developed lots remain subject to the original restrictions and are
therefore affected alike. It appears that the effect of the
amendment would be to merely reduce the size of the area subject
to the original restrictions. . . .
Having purchased their lots subject to the Declarations which
included a right of amendment the plaintiffs had no guaranty that
the addition would remain exclusively comprised of townhouses.
[Id., emp. added.]
See also Valdes v. Moore, supra, 476 S.W.2d at 939-41 (upholding majority amendment
during initial 25-year period removing portion of land from restrictions); Steve Vogli &
Co. v. Lane, 405 S.W.2d 885, 888-89 (Mo. 1966) (upholding majority deletion of certain
lots from restrictions-such amendment "need not be uniform as to all lots"); Morgan v.
Sigal, 157 A. 412, 413 (Conn. 1931) (restrictions are terminable as to any lot with consent
of majority).
In summary, the amendment at issue here, removing Lot 34 from the restrictions
of the Declaration, need not be unanimous. The amendment may be considered uniform
in effect, and even if not, the extreme cases cited by plaintiffs do not apply.

The

language of Part D.l. does not require unanimity, but permits amendment by a majority
of owners.

Moreover, as in Bryant, supra, the language does not limit the types of

amendments allowed. Accordingly, the amendment to permit a chapel and park on Lot
34 is valid.

11

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Order of the district court
and either order that the Church's motion for summary judgment be granted, or that the
case be remanded for trial.
Dated this /fV^day of March, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

By:

;2g£s-<^^^
B. Lloyd Poelman
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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